Newsletter
November 2009

          I'm in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, to carry out an audit on a security provider and its client. As is often the case, I was not very impressed by what I found. For obvious reasons I can’t say who they are. I often wonder how some of the companies offering safety and security measures to corporations operating in dangerous and hostile countries get their contracts. The inexperience of the client is generally the route of the problem. How does a construction company for instance know what to look for in a security company? This is my second survey in a month, the other carried out in Kandahar and Kabul. One of the security providers was so bad I had to summarise some of its procedures as nothing short of criminally negligent.

          Probably the most revealing test of a security provider is how they react when things go wrong. Sadly that’s often the only opportunity the client has to see how bad its security is. A security specialist can spot the amateur and usually only after a cursory glance at their equipment, standard operational procedures, and then most surely after attending an operational briefing. A good security provider is one that fully understands the threats, creates accurate written contingencies to prove it, and has the right equipment for the job and the right procedures for when things go wrong.

          Not all security providers are bad of course. Many take the job very seriously, produce effective plans and contingencies, etc. and reduce the risk to their clients at every turn. There are others who, although they take it seriously enough, don’t actually know what they’re doing. That is usually reflected in their backgrounds and experiences. Whenever you hear or read of a security company experiencing difficulties such as getting themselves or their client captured or killed the fault can nearly always be traced to a risk assessment misjudgement. Some companies employ former special forces operatives to provide advice on strategies and procedures and expect that to be a one-stop shop for all needs. But not every country’s special forces possess the pedigree and experiences required to run security operations for civilians in a war zone. For instance, what does a counter terrorism operative who spent his career dressed in black and bursting in through doors know about providing all the essential security components for a forward operating base in the middle of a hostile desert? The answer is practically nothing.

          The media seems to enjoy targeting PSCs (private security companies) and clearly it is often valid. But the truth is the reconstruction of places such as Afghanistan and Iraq could not take place without them. And it’s not just private companies that utilise private security. Most armies, including the US, do not have sufficient capabilities to provide close protection for all of their high ranking personnel who need it. I’ve met several high ranking US soldiers out and about in Baghdad accompanied by civilian close protection teams. And then there’s the life-blood of all those country-wide operations, both military and civilian? I’m talking about fuel, food, building materials, etc. These essential items aren’t provided by the military. Civilian companies sell it to the military and construction companies operating in far flung corners surrounded by hostiles and they have to get it to their customers on their own. The military and local police rarely provide escort services even for such essential goods. They’re too busy and don’t have the resources for the number of convoys transiting the countryside. The insurgents, as well as criminal gangs, are very eager to destroy or steal the fuel and materials and so the companies need to employ private armed security in order to protect them. These civilian convoys are the lifeblood of not just the reconstruction but the war itself and the Taliban in Afghanistan for instance are well aware of that. They attack these convoys constantly and mercilessly. I know of one company that sustains several serious attacks on its convoys a week and looses on average one security guard or driver per day. The general public is not aware of this because those statistics are local Afghans, Nepalese, Philippines or personnel from similar third world countries willing to take such high risks for mere dollars a day, which is more than they could earn in their own countries. And their rotations are generally 12 months on the job with 2 to 4 weeks off. Every one of them has a horror story to tell about lost colleagues and their own near death experiences. I suppose there aren’t too many journalists willing to sit alongside 300,000 litres of fuel with a high chance of being hit by an RPG just for the story.

          Enough about such unpleasantness. My next task is in the Seychelles and linked to piracy again, a most pleasant change from Afghanistan. I’m finishing off this letter in the air. I’m in a small plane. We took off from Bastion FOB in Helmand Province, just me and the two pilots. We were number two on the runway, behind a heavily laden unmanned predator. We watched the grey-blue, slender beast with its 2 metre wingspan ease along the runway and rise into the air. We took off and followed it for a short distance before it turned towards distant mountains and disappeared from sight. I could only wonder what its mission was.